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This study explores the CSR disclosure practices of the Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries during the period 2010- 2014 and examines the determinants of CSR disclosure and its 
effects on the firm value. Developing a comprehensive CSR disclosure index based on Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) Governance Standard No. 7 guidelines 
and using content analysis, the study shows a very low level of CSR disclosure among the sample Islamic 
banks. Again, using corporate governance characteristics to examine the determinants of CSR disclosure 
and applying the ordinary least square regression, it provides evidence of a significant positive association 
between board size and CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks, while negative significant relationship of 
CEO duality with CSR disclosure, as per expectation. To examine the economic consequences of CSR 
disclosure, the study documents an inverse performance effect of CSR disclosure, while board size, board 
composition and CEO duality have significant positive effect on firm value. These results instigate the 
global debate on the need for corporate governance reform in Islamic banks by providing insights on the 
role played by corporate governance mechanisms in encouraging and enhancing CSR disclosure practice 
among Islamic banks. The findings also have important implications for investors, managers, regulatory 
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The recent development of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has enormous impact on the role 
of business that resulted in the change of accounting practices (Aribi and Gao, 2010). CSR 
disclosure plays a significant role in business, including enhancing corporate transparency, 
developing corporate image, and providing useful information for investment decision-making 
(Gray et al., 1988; Friedman and Miles, 2001). The rising importance of CSR has also reflected in 
academic research (Plumlee et al, 2009; Johansen, 2010). Nowadays, companies are seen as 
organisations that operate within the society having responsibility to ensure socio-economic justice 
and, at the same time extend benefits to the stakeholders including shareholders (Mohammed, 
2007), consistent with the stakeholder theory perspectives. As the banks realise the significance of 
stakeholders financial anticipation, the role of CSR disclosure has become more important as a 
means of discharging accountability (Gray et al., 1996; Park and Ghauri, 2014). The pressure on 
companies to be accountable to a wider audience of stakeholders is coming from a number of 
sources such as the ethical investors, consumer associations, a growing number of pressure groups 
and United Nations and European Community Directives (Gray et al., 1988). When firms discloses 
CSR activities, they discharge accountability to a broader spectrum of stakeholders rather than 
shareholders alone. Such disclosures provide insights beyond those conveyed in financial 
disclosures and can help diminution of the information gap, enhance the credibility of corporate 
reporting, and add to empathetic the role of accounting information in firm valuation. While Klein 
et al (2005) have documented the consequences of disclosure on firm value, Pagano et al. (2002) 
content that disclosure is a mechanisms that allow investors to increase their ability in firm’ 
monitoring as well as enhancing firm value.  
 The development of the agency theory has resulted in the implementation of governance 
structures whereby the control of decisions is separated from the management (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Prior studies have used the theoretical framework of the agency theory to test hypotheses 
concerning with the extent of disclosure to corporate governance characteristics (Xiao and Yuan, 
2007). Gul and Leung (2004) argue that the role of corporate governance on the agency 
relationship between managers and stakeholders can best be examined by looking at several 
governance mechanisms. Numerous studies that examined the factors affecting disclosure 
suggested that corporate governance and firm characteristics are the key drivers for corporate 
disclosure level, either as a whole (Samaha et al., 2015; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013; Farook et al., 
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2011; Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009) or for different types of disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007). Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms can be considered as 
essential factors illustrative to the decisions of corporate disclosure related to CSR from agency 
and stakeholder theory perspectives. Other streams of research also shows that disclosure reporting 
plays an important role in improving communication with stakeholders along with a positive 
impact on the firm value (Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Anam et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2008; Schwaiger, 
2004; Hassan et al., 2009; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). In fact, the association between disclosure 
and firm value is adequately explained the signaling theory in the sense that comprehensive 
disclosure signals better governance mechanisms, therefore leading to higher firm value. 
 The growth of Islamic banking and financial system has been one of its hallmarks since its 
inception in 19751 and its market capitalisation currently stands at USD $2.05 trillion (IFSB, 
2018). Despite its growth, it is believed that Islamic banking represents the absolute ethical codes 
of Islamic religion because of the unique characteristics of Islamic finance – no interest (riba), 
prevention of uncertainty (gharar) and gambling (maysir) and the insistence of ‘real’ transactions 
(El-Gamal, 2005). In fact, the Islamic codes impose strong social obligations on Muslim 
individuals and organisations (Maali et al., 2003).  From the Islamic perspective, CSR represents 
accountability to God (Allah) and then accountability towards society/stakeholders (El-Halaby & 
Hussainey, 2015), therefore, they can be interpreted as institutions, which promote social justice 
and social responsibility (Maliah, 2000). In the Islamic context, social responsibilities represent 
the concept of brotherhood “ukhuwah” from one to another. As such, the social role is very 
important for Islamic banks and they can be described as banks who have a social face towards 
the society (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Al-Mubarak and Osmani, 2010; Hasan, 2011). 
Consequently, as Islamic banks that operate in Islamic principles, they should be more active on 
promoting CSR and accountable towards stakeholders and society in general. Based on the 
accountability principles, Islamic banks are required to disclose all information that reflect their 
identity (Bayoud et al., 2012). It is expected that Islamic Banks disclose CSR information in a 
succinct, truthful and comprehensible method to meet their stakeholder’s needs (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007) as well as enhance their transparency and improve ethical behaviour (Case and Al-
qadi, 2012). The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
                                                          
1 Institutions offering Islamic financial services started emerging in 1960 in isolation, the real momentum of Islamic 
banking and finance started in 1975 with establishment of Dubai Islamic Bank and the Jeddah Islamic Development 
Bank (Ayub, 2007). 
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(AAOIFI) also reiterates that Islamic banks should disclose all information necessary to inform 
the community about their operations affecting the community wellbeing (AAOIFI, 2010). 
 The existing body of the CSR literature in Islamic banks focuses on either the level of CSR 
disclosure (Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Aribi and Gao, 2012) or the determinants of CSR 
disclosure (Farook et al., 2011; Amin et al. 2011; Rahman and Bukair 2013). However, prior 
studies have not provided evidence on the factors determining CSR disclosure for Islamic banks 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Again, most of previous studies are conducted 
before the issuance of an updated AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 7, not represents a clear 
benchmark of CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks. The motivation behind this study derives 
from the dearth of research on CSR disclosure in Islamic banks in GCC countries after the issuance 
of AAOIFI’s Governance Standards no. 7 in 2010. In fact, only a handful studies adopts AAOIFI 
as a best practice for CSR reporting for Islamic Banks based on the latest AAOIFI overnance 
standards versions, 20102 which provides variations of CSR disclosure practices between banks 
and countries. Also, prior studies (Case and Al-qadi, 2012; Maali et al., 2006) have not clearly 
examined how CSR reporting could influence a firm’s value for GCC Islamic banks. This study 
aims to bridge the research gap by exploring the CSR disclosure practice among the Islamic banks 
in GCC and then examining its determinants and consequences (firm value).  
This study contributes to the existing disclosure literature in a number of ways, firstly, in 
fulfilling prior research gap, it explores the CSR disclosure score of Islamic banks in GCC. Unlike 
prior research, this study also enhances the understanding of the factors explaining the cross-
sectional variation in the quantity of the information disclosed by Islamic banks using the 
benchmark develop based on AAOIFI standards no 7. Expending an integrated CSR framework, 
it investigates the extent to which corporate governance mechanisms explain the variations of CSR 
practice in GCC Islamic banks. To the best of knowledge, no other studies attempted this. This 
study differs from previous studies (Maali et al., 2003; Thompson and Zakaria, 2004; Hussainey, 
2011; Mallin, Farag and Ow-Yong, 2014; Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Platonova, 2013), which also 
discuss the issue of CSR disclosure by narrowly focusing on GCC perspectives. Therefore, 
developing a comprehensive disclosure index and using AAOIFI governance standards, the study 
provides an insight on CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in the GCC region, which is 
                                                          
2 From the researcher knowledge there is no updated of governance standards which relate to CSR disclosure practice 
in AAOIFI, 2014. 
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supported by prior research (e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Platonova, 2014; Maali et al., 2006; 
Abdul Rahman et al., 2010; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Aribi and Gao, 2012 Ullah, 2013). 
Secondly, this study focuses on corporate governance mechanisms which contains board related 
variables to understand more completely how these factors jointly impact on the level of 
compliance and CSR disclosure. Thirdly, the impact of disclosure on firm value still remains 
inconclusive (Vogel 2005; Hassan et al., 2009; Al-Akra et al, 2010) and an open empirical 
question, particularly for Islamic banks. There is a little direct empirical evidence with regard to 
the relationship between disclosure and firm value in general and for Islamic banks in particular. 
Such inconclusiveness creates ground for further investigation such as CSR. While evidence 
proposes that proactive social accountability enhances firm value and AAOIFI has issued 
governance standards for Islamic banks focusing on enhancing CSR, there is an absence of 
academic research that investigates the prospective economic consequences and social disclosure 
for Islamic banks. As such, this study fills this gap in the literature by providing a direct analysis 
on the effect of CSR on firm value through alternative measures of firm value. This study focus 
on Islamic banks that provides a unique empirical setting to investigate the prospective economic 
consequences and social disclosure for Islamic banks i.e. the impacts of CSR on firm value. The 
findings generate incremental insights to managers who seek to enhance the firm value (FV) of 
Islamic banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organize as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature 
review and the hypothesis development, followed by the research methodology and data in Section 
3 and empirical results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides brief discussion and concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. Review of literature and hypotheses development 
Generally, various theories have been developed to explain the variation between entities in terms 
of their level of disclosure. While there is no general or comprehensive disclosure theory that can 
be applied, it is argued that several theories such as agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory could be used in an integrated framework to provide an explanation for 
managerial incentives which affect CSR disclosure (Al-Htaybat, 2005). These theories can explain 
the disclosure phenomena as well as managers’ incentives for disclosure. Alberti-Alhtaybat et al. 
(2012) argue that disclosure theories, such as agency theory and stakeholder theory, would be of 
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great help in explaining a particular phenomenon by providing clear insights in the understanding 
of the CSR disclosure practices. Prior studies (Farook et al., 2011) argue that there is a consistency 
between agency theory and stakeholder theory, therefore, both theories can be considered as 
interrelated theories to explain the determinants of CSR disclosure practice in GCC Islamic Banks. 
In general, agency theory concentrates on the relationship between the principal and the agents 
who are given the authority to manage the principal’s interests and make beneficial decisions. 
According to general stakeholder theory, society expects corporations to behave in a manner that 
is beneficial in terms of their social or economic role. Again, the influence of CSR disclosure on 
firm value can be understood based on agency and signaling theory. Signalling theory can be 
applied in the event of information asymmetry where outsiders usually do not have access to the 
internal information about the company, which is only available to the managers. According to 
signalling theory, a manager discloses information in order to reduce information asymmetry and 
to signal to outsiders that a firm is performing better than its peers (Álvarez et al., 2008). Signalling 
theory posits that investors rely on the information delivered by firms (Abhayawansa and 
Abeysekera, 2009), highlighting that the credibility of information is crucial in ensuring less 
information asymmetry (Hughes, 1986). 
 Corporate governance mechanisms can be considered as essential factors, illustrative of 
the decisions of corporate disclosure related to CSR from agency and stakeholder theory 
perspectives. Very limited research has been undertaken to examine the link between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the CSR disclosure practice of GCC Islamic banks. Most of the 
previous studies, which explore corporate governance as a factor behind the disclosure level, just 
focused on governance variables related to board-related variables (Taylor et al., 2010; Cong and 
Freedman, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Bokpin, 2013; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014). A limited 
number of studies explore governance related to Shariah supervisory board (SSB) as a unique 
mechanism for Islamic banks (Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Farook et al., 2011). According 
to Rahman and Bukair (2015), it is expected that numerous factors could drive variances between 
Islamic banks and its CSR disclosure practices. Previous studies (Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Wan 
Amalina Wan Abdullah, 2009) provide robust evidence on the corporate governance mechanisms 
which influence on the CSR information disclosure among the financial and non-financial 
companies. Thus, in developing the research hypothesis, this study use corporate governance 
characteristics as a main explanatory variables and firm characteristics as a control variable in 
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measuring the determinants of CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks. 
 
2.1 Hypotheses for determinants of CSR 
2.1.1 Board size, composition and meeting  
The board of directors consists of the total number of executive and non-executive directors on the 
board. In general, the size of the boards in a company, such as an Islamic bank, can improve their 
efficiency in handling and solving any presence issues, such as CSR-related issues. Empirical 
evidence in corporate governance suggests that the board size impacts the level of controlling, 
monitoring, and disclosure (Rahman and Bukair, 2015). However, Wang and Hussainey (2013) 
claimed that larger boards’ effectiveness is negatively affected by the presence of problems 
regarding communication and coordination. In turn, some studies have indicated that larger boards 
incorporate a variety of expertise, which result in greater effectiveness in terms of the boards’ 
monitoring role (Singh et al., 2004; Abdel Fattah, 2007). Based on agency and signalling theory, 
this study expects that larger board sizes will increase board-monitoring capabilities; as a result, 
this gives positive influences to disclosure practice in Islamic banks. 
Besides board size, board composition also reflects how much the banks are linked to the 
outside world, as a result, they will be more aware on CSR issues and improve their CSR disclosure 
practice. Board composition is the proportion of outside directors (non-executive/independence) 
and inside directors (executive/non-independence) to the total number of directors appointed in 
the company (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013). Board composition is seen as an important 
indicator of board independence. It is stated that directors’ independence can strengthen the board 
by monitoring, advising, and counselling the top management (Anderson and Reeb., 2004) and 
protecting the investors’ interests (Petra, 2005). In particular, the non-executive directors are 
perceived to bring a fresh and wider view to board discussion and decision making, such as CSR 
disclosure practice. Based on legitimacy theory, it is anticipated that larger composition of non- 
executive boards would improve the CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks  
Frequent board meetings are important, because they enable the directors to control the 
company effectively (Tuggle et al. 2010; Hossain, 2008). Active boards members will tend to 
signal their performance to potential employers (Hasan, 2011). Laksamana (2008) and Taha (2010) 
find that there is a positive association between board meetings and transparency of compensation 
disclosure. In accordance with signalling theory where frequent board meeting represents more 
8 
 
proactive board, a positive association between board meetings and CSR disclosure is expected. 
Thus, based on above discussion the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Board size, composition and meeting have positive effects on CSR disclosure. 
 
2.1.2 Board gender composition and cross-holding directorship 
In recent years, board diversity has become a significant element of governance arrangement. 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) contend that the theme of board diversity correctly matches into the 
structure of stakeholder theory. Prior studies reported that more women on board contributes to a 
greater disclosure and higher incidence of assurance reports accompanying such disclosures 
(Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012), stronger orientation towards corporate social reporting and a 
higher intensity of social performance (Sicilian, 1996) and positive association with corporate 
social reporting (Amran et al., 2014). Therefore, firms with a higher proportion of women directors 
do engage in more CSR disclosure practices and CSR activities, such as charitable activities 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Based on stakeholder theory, we argue that a higher proportion of 
women directors on the board are expected to influence the CSR disclosure in Islamic banks. 
Another potential determinants related to the board characteristics are cross-holding 
directorship sitting on more than one board. It has been suggested in the literature (Ahmed, 2013; 
Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Haniffa, 1999) that cross-holding directorship will help in making 
information more transparent, as well as encourage the sharing of experience. However, the 
concentration of decision-making power may result in opportunistic behaviour by that individual 
cross-holding director (Khan, 2010) and make them less independent (Aguilera, 1998; Young et 
al., 2008). Again, it is argued that cross-holdings will encourage companies to be transparent 
because such directors will have better knowledge of the practices in companies on which they sit 
(Lewis, 2005). Based on agency theory, Islamic banks which have no cross holding director are 
expected to have effective performance and better CSR disclosure score. Thus, based on above 
discussion the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 2: Board gender composition and cross-holding directorship have positive  
effects on CSR disclosure. 
2.1.3 CEO duality  
Role duality in a position exists when the CEO (chief executive officer) is also the chairman of the 
board. Agency theory predicts that role duality creates individual power for the CEO that would 
affect the effective control exercised by the board (Zahir, 2008). It has been suggested in the 
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previous literature (Tuggle et al., 2010; Hashim and Devi, 2008; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 
2010; Peng et al., 2007) that these two roles should be separated, mainly for reasons of 
independence. Although the separation of roles is suggested, some companies are not prepared to 
be absolutely categorical about dividing the roles (Rahman and Bukair, 2015). Based on agency 
theory, Islamic banks which are free CEO duality issue are expected to have better CSR disclosure 
score. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: CEO duality has negative effect on CSR disclosure. 
 
2.1.4 SSB size and cross-membership 
The Shariah Supervisory Board has social influence and authority in monitoring the Islamic banks’ 
compliance with Shariah principles and provides the confidence to stakeholders about the 
legitimacy of the business transactions. However, the degree to which the SSB influences the level 
of CSR disclosure is depending on SSB characteristics, such as board size. Therefore, the SSB size 
is expected to have a positive impact on CSR disclosure (Farook et al., 2011). Empirical evidence 
suggests that SSB size can affect the level of disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Based on 
AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 1, the SSB members in Islamic banks is between three and five 
members. Agency theory predicts that larger boards incorporate a variety of expertise that results 
in more effectiveness in the monitoring role of the boards (Singh et al., 2004). With more members, 
the collective knowledge and experience of SSB will increase, leading to greater disclosure. 
Concerned with banking sector, and especially Islamic banks, Farag et al. (2014) find a positive 
significant association between the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size and disclosure index. 
 Cross memberships of SSB members may also lead to higher disclosure of CSR 
information (Dahya, Lonie and Power, 1996). Farook et al. 2011, suggest that cross-directorships 
will increase transparency and accountability in financial reporting. SSB members with cross-
memberships will be exposed to more discussions about the application of Islamic law in banking, 
in particular to CSR disclosure practice. Thus, based on above discussion the following hypothesis 
is formulated: 
Hypothesis 4: SSB size and cross-membership have positive effects on CSR disclosure. 
 
2.1.5 Audit committee size and meeting 
Audit committee monitoring is not only about the financial reporting process; it extends to the 
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reporting of non-financial information (Li et al., 2012) such as, CSR information disclosure. 
Mangena and Pike (2005) suggest that larger audit committees give rise to more effective 
monitoring. Li et al. (2012) report a positive relationship between audit committee size and the 
quality of financial reporting, while Tauringana and Mangena (2009) find no statistically 
significant relationship between the level of disclosure and audit committee size. Based on agency 
theory, it is expected that larger audit committee size will increase board-monitoring capabilities 
(Rahman and Bukhair, 2015). 
 An active audit committee with high frequency of meetings will have enough time to 
discharge its duties. Prior research provides evidence on a positive relationship between audit 
committee meetings and subcategories of financial reporting (Kelton and Yang, 2008; Li et al., 
2012). Amran et al. (2014) recommend that AC meetings should not be fewer than three meetings 
a year to enhance the companies sustainable reporting. Based on agency theory, frequent audit 
committee meeting may provide effective monitoring to Islamic banks activities and better CSR 
information in their annual report. Thus, based on above discussion the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
Hypothesis 5: Audit committee size and meeting have positive effects on CSR disclosure. 
 
2.1.6 Institutional ownership and foreign ownership  
Agency theory predicts that ownership structure affects the level of disclosure. In the literature, 
the relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure is mixed ranging from positive, 
negative and no association (Barako et al., 2006; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Schadewitz and 
Blevins, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Akhigbe and Martin (2006) found a positive association 
between disclosure and institutional ownership, based on the financial services industry. Hidalgo 
et al. (2011 p.490) state that “the results appear to corroborate the view that an increase in 
institutional investor shareholding has a negative effect on voluntary disclosure, supporting the 
hypothesis of entrenchment, whereas an excessive ownership by institutional investors may have 
adverse effects on strategic disclosure decisions”. 
 Foreign owners are typically assumed to play a key role in supporting CSR reporting 
strategies (Ayuso and Argandona, 2007). Agency theory for additional information increase with 
the increase in ownership numbers. Soderstrom and Sun (2007) contend that the extent of foreign 
investor ownership is an important determinant of the demand for financial information. Sharma 
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(2014) and Haniffa and Cooke (2005) find a positive association between foreign ownership and 
disclosures. Thus, based on above discussion the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 6: Institutional ownership and foreign ownership have positive effects on CSR  
disclosure. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses for effect of CSR on firm value  
In the literature, the impact of CSR disclosure on firm value is limited and it is scarce in GCC 
Islamic banks. Rhodes and Soobaroyen (2010) argue that disclosure can curtail agency problems 
by decreasing information asymmetry, thus enhance firm value. Sheu et al. (2010) contend that 
the market only provides a higher valuation to those corporations that elect to disclose inclusive 
information. Anam et al. (2011), Dhaliwal et al. (2011),  Gordon et al. (2010) and Garay et al. 
(2013) report that the extent of disclosure has a significant positive effect on the firm value. 
Further, Villiers (2013) examines the effect of a firm’s governance measures on the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and firm value and reveals a stronger link between CSR disclosures and 
firm value in stronger governance countries. Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) find a positive 
relationship between CSR disclosure quality and market capitalization of Saudi non-financial 
listed companies. However, the direction and magnitude of the relationship is associated with the 
type of disclosure (Hassan et al., 2009) and the proxy that used for firm value (Uyar and Kiliç, 
2012). Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) argued that both CSR disclosure quantity and quality have 
the same impact on firm value, but the significance of this impact depends on the proxy used in 
measuring the firm value. The influence of CSR disclosure on firm value (FV) can be understood 
based on agency, signalling, and economic theory. most of prior studies (Rhodes and Soobaroyen 
(2010) Al-Akra et al (2010); Sheu et al (2010) Gordon et al (2010); Anam et al (2011) ;Dhaliwal 
et al (2011); Garay et al (2013) and Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) ) find a positive relationship 
between the level of disclosure and firm value. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 7: CSR disclosure has a positive effect on firm value 
 
 
3. Research methodology and data 
3.1 Sample and data 
The current study uses secondary data relating to CSR disclosure, its determinants, and 
consequences. The data is collected from annual reports, Bank Scopes, data stream databases and 
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company web sites. The sample banks are selected based on a criteria of full-fledged Islamic banks 
or banks which are 100% comply with Shariah. According to Bankers database, there are 62 full-
fledged licensed Islamic banks in GCC. For the sake of consistency in the research sample, Islamic 
banks’ subsidiaries and banks that have not published an English version of the annual report are 
excluded. Accordingly, 23 banks are excluded, leaving the final sample of this study consists of 
39 Islamic banks, which represents 63% of the population. The study is conducted from 2010 due 
to the latest Governance Standards Issued by the AAOIFI in 2010. So, the dataset is designed for 
5 years (2010-2014) with 39 Islamic banks (195 observations), providing sufficient information of 
disclosure practices across Islamic banks operating in the GCC countries. The fiscal year of 2010-
2014 chosen to ensure a reasonable access to bank, reports’ and gives a clear picture of disclosure 
practice. The sample breakdown across countries is summarized in Table 1.    
 
Table 1: Sample breakdown across countries 
No Countries Total Number of Islamic Banks Sample Islamic Banks 
1 Bahrain 27 15 
2 Qatar 9 6 
3 Kuwait 6 3 
4 KSA 6 4 
5 Oman 5 3 
6 UAE 9 8 
 TOTAL 62 39 
Source: Bank scope Database and DataStream, June 2017 
 
3.2 Research methods 
This study adopts quantitative research approach. Yearly financial reports of the sample Islamic 
banks are gather from the Bank Scope Database and their websites. Other data such as, charitable 
activities and social responsibility in the index and details of their data which are not available in 
the financial report are collected from the banks newsletter and website. To measure the CSR 
disclosure quantity in the study, the un-weighted content analysis method is employed to code and 
measure CSR disclosures over the annual reports, ensuring the validity and the reliability of the 
analysis.3 Therefore, ‘1’ is given for each CSR disclosed in the annual report, and ‘0’ if there are 
no CSR disclosure items disclosed in the annual report. A total of 11 dimensions of the CSR 
                                                          
3 If the Cronbach’s Alpha shows more than 70%, it means the measurement is reliable (Aryani, 2015). Un-tabulated 




disclosure index are developed based on governance standard No.7 issued by AAOIFI, which 
relate to CSR disclosure requirement for Islamic banks and could be either mandatory or voluntary 
disclosure. The main dimensions of the index consist of four main aspects, which cover the issues 
of social responsibility within organizations, social responsibility in its relationship with customers 
and clients, social responsibility in screening its investments, and social responsibility in its 
relationship with greater society. Appendix 1 presents the summary of the main and sub- 
dimensions in measuring CSR disclosure practices among the sample Islamic banks in the GCC 
that are used in this study. Again, to enhance the reliability of the instrument, the disclosure items 
are coded and checked twice to ensure it is free from any potential discrepancies (Taliyang and 
Jusop, 2011). The quantity of disclosure is measured through the calculation of a Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure Index (CSRDI) score. As indicated before, the approach to scoring items 
is essentially dichotomous in that an item in the research instrument scores ‘1’ if communicated 
and ‘0’ if it is not (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007), and is additive and 
equally weighted to avoid potential scoring bias and scaling problems (Cooke, 1989). The method 
used in measuring the CSR disclosure level of the sample Islamic banks is as follows:  





CSRDI = corporate social reporting index score for company i. and for the year t 
N = number of items in the index 
j= indicates each item included in the index 
 
Thus, the value of the index, for each companies i for the year t, is obtained as the sum of the 
scores assigned to each item in Score (j). It can be standardized as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐼(𝑖, 𝑡) = (
∑ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑗)𝑁𝑖=1
𝑁
) x 100 =  
Total Score(𝑖, 𝑡)
𝑁
 x 100 
 
3.3 Regression models 
To test hypotheses 1-6 empirically, the association between CSR disclosure levels with governance 
variables (board, SSB, audit committee, and ownership variables), a comprehensive regression 
model that consists of 6 board-related variables, 2 SSB-related variables, 2 audit committee -
related variables and 2-ownership variables has been developed. It also adds control variables 
consisting of 5 firms’ characteristics variables and 2 country-specific variables. Accordingly, using 
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the same procedure of Chan et al. (2012), the following OLS regression technique is applied:   
 
 
CSRDit =  α +  β1B. Sizeit + β2B. Genderit +  β3B. Compit +  β4B. Meetit +  β5CEO. Dualit +  β6B. CrossHoldit +
 β7SSB. Sizeit +  β8SSB. Crossit  +  β9AC. Sizeit+β10AC. Meetit +  β11Ins. Ownit+β12For. Ownit +  β13F. Sizeit +
  β14F. Ageit +  β15F. Profitit +  β16F. Levit + β17F. Liquidit+β18GDPit + β19Corruptit + Year Dummy +  ɛ  --- (1) 
 
Where: 
CSRDit = is the total CSR disclosure score provided by CSR disclosure index, which measures the level of disclosure 
CSR in the sample Islamic banks i at year t or known as the dependent variable. Summary of CSR disclosure 
dimensions is set out in Appendix 1. 
β1- β12 = independent variables. CG Variables consists of: B. Size (board size), B. Gender (board gender), B. Comp 
(board composition), B. Meet (board meeting), B. Dual (board duality), B. Cross Hold (board cross holding), SSB 
size, SSB cross membership, AC Size (audit committee size), AC Meet (audit committee meeting), Ins. Own 
(institutional ownership), and For. Own (foreign ownership). Variable definitions are set out in Appendix 2. 
β13- β19= control variables. Firms (in this study refers to Islamic banks) and country-specific variables consist of: F. 
Size (firm size), F. Age (firm age), F. Profit (firm profitability), F. Lev. (firm leverage), F. Liquid (firm liquidity), 
GDP (gross domestic product of the country) and Corrupt (the corruption index of the country). Firm and country-
specific characteristics variables of the sample Islamic banks have been collected from various databases such as 
DataStream, World Bank, Transparency index database and annual reports. Variable definitions are set out in 
Appendix 2. 
Year dummy variables = Year 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 as a dummy variable. 
 
Again, to test hypotheses 7 empirically, the relationship between the CSR disclosure levels and 
firm value, this study applies the following OLS regression: 
 
FVit =  α +  β1CSRDit + β2B. Sizeit + β3B. Compit + β4CEO. Dualit + β5F. Sizeit + β6F. Profitit+ β7F. Levit +




FV = is the firm value measured using MTBV (market-to-book ratio) or MC (market capitalisation) or TQ (Tobin’s 
Q) as proxy for sample Islamic banks also known as dependent variable. Variable definitions are set out in Appendix 
2. 
β1 = Independent variables (CSRD score of the sample Islamic banks).  
β2 - β8= Control variables (governance, firm and country specific variables).  





4. Empirical results  
This study conducts the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to ensure that the data are normally distributed. 
Based on the test, it finds that all data is normally distributed. Following Aryani (2015), 
heteroscedasticity test is also conducted and the un-tabulated result shows that all variables are 
more than 0.05 indicating no sign of heteroscedasticity problem. Again, to avoid multicollinearity 
among the independent variables that would affect the reliability of the estimates and may cause a 
15 
 
wide inflation in the standard errors for the coefficient, Pearson correlation matrix is tested. 
Gujarati (2003) indicates that collinearity among the independent variables is acceptable if the 
correlation coefficient (r) is at maximum as 0.80. The un-tabulated Pearson correlation matrix 
results shows that there is no multicollinearity problem in this study as the association among the 
variables are below 0.80. In addition, variance inflation factor (VIF) is calculated. This procedure 
is an additional step to ensure that explanatory variables are not extremely correlated. The rule that 
has been applied is correlation between independent variables is accepted if VIF is still smaller 
than 10 (Gujarati, 2003). The un-tabulated VIF results of this study are higher than 0.1 and less 
than 10, implying that the variables do not have a multicollinearity/autocorrelation problem.  
 
4.1 CSR disclosure in GCC countries  
Table 2 presents the cross-country analysis (Panel A) and cross-dimensional analysis (Panel B) of 
CSR disclosure of 195 observations of the GCC Islamic banks between 2010 and 2014 compliant 
with the AAOIFI’s Governance Standard No. 7. Panel A shows an improvement of CSR disclosure 
practice among Omani and KSI banks than other GCC countries. There is no significant difference 
of CSR disclosure practice among the GCC Islamic banks after issuance of AAOIFI, No. 7, 
suggesting that the AAOIFI has no influence on the GCC Islamic banks. From the dimensional 
analysis in Panel B, it appears that the GCC Islamic banks tend to disclose employee-related 
information and Zakat in their annual report more than other CSR information. Overall, the result 
shows a low level of disclosure for CSR reporting for the sample Islamic banks. Again, the mean 
CSR disclosure of the sample Islamic banks is 39.92%, which is far short of expectation. This 
implies that Islamic banks are not completely fulfilling their social role in accordance with the 
Islamic principles. Low level of CSR disclosure score indicates that Islamic bank managers are 
less accountable in performing their duties and expected to be more aware on CSR issues in future. 
Table 2: Cross-country and cross-dimensional analysis of CSRD for GCC Islamic banks  
Panel A: Cross-country analysis of CSRD for GCC Islamic Banks (2010-2014) 
COUNTRY 2010(%) Ranks 2011(%) Ranks 2012(%) Ranks 2013(%) Ranks 2014(%) Ranks 
1) UAE 51.1 2 43.2 3 37.5 3 45.5 2 43.2 3 
2) BAHRAIN 45.5 4 34.6 5 30.9 5 41.2 3 35.2 4 
3) QATAR 47.0 3 34.9 4 36.4 4 33.3 4 30.3 6 
4) KUWAIT 54.6 1 45.5 2 45.5 1 45.5 2 33.3 5 
5) KSA 43.2 5 50.0 1 38.6 2 45.5 2 52.3 2 
6) OMAN 27.3 6 24.2 6 24.2 6 51.5 1 60.6 1 
 Mean CSRD across 2010-2014:  39.92 % 
Panel B: Cross-dimensional analysis of CSRD score and percentage for GCC Islamic banks (2010-2014) 
Items 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
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Score % Score % Score % Score % Score % 
1) EY 38 97.4 38 97.4 39 100 38 97.4 39 100 
2) EV 8 20.5 1 2.5 5 12.8 14 35.9 4 10.2 
3) NSE 5 12.8 14 35.9 13 33.3 18 46.1 23 58.9 
4) CS 25 64.1 10 25.6 6 15.3 11 28.2 5 12.8 
5) LP 4 10.2 1 2.5 1 2.5 1 2.5 1 2.5 
6) Qard 16 41 20 51.2 19 48.7 19 48.7 21 53.8 
7) SME 20 51.2 19 48.7 20 51.2 22 56.4 22 56.4 
8) S.Client 13 33.3 4 10.2 0 0 1 2.5 3 7.6 
9) Zakat 31 79.4 31 79.4 34 87.1 38 97.4 37 94.8 
10) Charity 32 82 21 53.8 10 25.6 19 48.7 11 28.2 
11) Waqf 5 12.8 4 10.2 1 2.5 1 2.5 4 10.2 
1. Employee welfare (EY) 2. Policy for social, development and environment based investment quotas (EV) 3. Earning and expenditure prohibited by 
Shariah (NSE) 4. Par excellence customer services (CS) 5. Policy for dealing with clients for late repayment and insolvent clients and avoiding onerous 
terms (LP) 6. Qard-Hassan (benevolent loan) (Qard) 7. Micro and small business and social savings, investments and development (SME) 8. Policy for 
screening clients for compliance with Islamic principles (S.Client) 9. Zakat (Zakat) 10. Charitable activities (Charity) 11. Endowment management 
(Waqf ). Score (CSR disclosure score of sample Islamic banks) % (Percentage of CSR disclosure score of sample Islamic banks) 
 
4.2 Determinants of CSR disclosure and its effect on firm value in GCC countries  
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics in Panel A for the variables used in equation 1 to examine 
CSR disclosure determinants, while descriptive statistics in Panel B for the variables used in 
equation 2 to examine the effect of CSR disclosure on firm value. In Panel A, the mean value of 
CSR disclosure quantity (CSRD) is 0.3992, with a minimum and maximum of value of 0.09 and 
0.73, respectively. Average board size of the sample Islamic banks is 9, with maximum 16 and 
minimum 4 members. Again, SSB average size is 4 and minimum 3, maximum 6 members. On 
average, 82% directors are male and 18% female, while 34% directors are independent. Board 
meeting has a mean value of 6.45, with minimum 4 and maximum 11 meetings in a year. 18% 
firms have CEO duality and 85% directors have cross directorships. Again, SSB average cross 
holding is 80%. Mean value of audit committee size is 4, with minimum 2 and maximum 7 
members. Audit committee meeting has a mean value of 5.25, with minimum 2 and maximum 7 
meetings in a year. Mean values of institutional and foreign ownerships are 19% and 18%, 
respectively. Further, in Panel B, the average natural logarithm of market value of market to book 
value of equity ratio (MTBV) is 1.5960, while market capitalization (MC) and TQ (Tobin’s Q) 
are, respectively 6.3477 and 0.81.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Panel A: Equation 1 Variables 2010-2014 (N=195) 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CSRD 0.3992 0.13026 0.09 0.73 
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B.SIZE 9.1538 2.24227 4.00 16.00 
B.GENDER 0.8205 0.38475 0.00 1.00 
B.COMP 0.3386 0.12557 0.10 0.75 
B.MEET 6.4564 1.16738 4.00 11.00 
CEO.DUAL 0.1795 0.38475 0.00 1.00 
B.Cross HOLD 0.8462 0.36173 0.00 1.00 
SSB SIZE 4.0769 1.02506 3.00 6.00 
SSB CROSS 0.7949 0.40483 0.00 1.00 
AC SIZE 4.1282 1.04486 2.00 7.00 
AC MEET 5.2564 0.90582 2.00 7.00 
INS. OWN 0.1926 0.06671 0.11 0.40 
FOR.OWN 0.1852 0.04811 0.11 0.33 
F.SIZE 3.5987 1.05947 1.10 5.84 
F.AGE 17.8000 14.61379 1.00 57.00 
F.PROFIT 8.2287 14.12631 -127.15 24.19 
F.LEV 110.4239 108.22184 0.04 771.16 
F.LIQUID 48.8651 22.18020 0.36 84.44 
C.GDP 10.8787 0.48287 10.32 11.72 
C.CORRUPT 5.5662 1.03724 4.30 7.70 
Panel B: Equation 2 Variables 2010-2014 (N=195) 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
MTBV 1.5960 1.11883 0.30 6.79 
MC 6.3477 0.94080 3.92 8.17 
TQ 0.8102 0.14803 0.00 0.93 
CSRD 0.3992 0.13026 0.09 0.73 
B.SIZE 9.1538 2.24227 4.00 16.00 
B.COMP 0.3386 0.12557 0.10 0.75 
CEO.DUAL 0.1795 0.38475 0.00 1.00 
F.SIZE 3.5987 1.05947 1.10 5.84 
F.PROFIT 8.2287 14.12631 -127.15 24.19 
F.LEV 110.4239 108.22184 0.04 771.16 
GDP 10.8787 0.48287 10.32 11.72 
4.2.2 Empirical Analysis for Determinants of CSR Disclosure  
Table 4 presents empirical analysis of CSR disclosure determinants of Islamic banks in the GCC. 
Board size has a coefficient of 0.174, showing positive significant impact on the levels of CSR 
disclosure at 5% level of significance. Therefore, H1 is accepted. This indicates that increased 
board membership enhances CSR disclosure, consistent with the studies of Singh et al. (2004), 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Abdel-Fattah et al. (2007) and Laksamana (2008).  The benefit of 
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having a larger board is that it can increase company’s value, because they provide a firm with 
members from different fields of expertise (Khan 2010). Islamic banks with a higher board size do 
engage to a greater extent in CSR disclosure practices and CSR activities. Again, as expected, a 
negative significant relation is found between CEO duality and CSR disclosure practice among 
GCC Islamic banks at 5% significance level. Therefore, H3 is also rejected. This is not consistent 
to agency theory as CEO duality is seen as detrimental to disclosure because of the 'dominant 
personality' phenomenon. This result is consistent with prior studies (Tuggle et al., 2010; Hashim 
and Devi, 2008; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Peng et al., 2007), suggesting these two roles 
should be separated in enhancing the monitoring quality and disclosure practice. Although the 
separation of roles is suggested, some companies are not prepared to be categorical about dividing 
the roles (Rahman and Bukair 2015). Thus, the assumptions that separation of chair and CEO roles 
will enhance the monitoring quality and improve benefits from not withholding information such 
as CSR reporting can be rejected. Further, the analysis also shows that there is a significantly 
negative relationship between audit committee size and the CSR disclosure practice among GCC 
Islamic banks at 5% level of significance, which is contrary to expectation and contradictory to 
the findings of Li et al. (2012) showing positive relationship and Tauringana and Mangena (2009) 
showing no statistically significant relationship. Therefore, H5 is rejected. This is may be due to 
the lack of audit committee function to influence the board/management. 
 Table 4 results also show that there is no association between CSR disclosure and other 
governance variables, which is consistent with the argument by Ho and Wong (2001) that 
corporate governance mechanisms may be substitutive and may not affect disclosure scores. As 
for control variables, only country GDP appears to have positive effect on CSR disclosure at 5% 
level of significance and others show no significant relationship. It is in line with Olken & Pande 
(2012) who find that there is a positive association between GDP and the level of disclosure. 
Regarding year dummy variables, only 2010 shows positive effect on CSR disclosure. Overall, the 
above findings have practical implications for the GCC Islamic banks to improve their governance 
mechanisms for ensuring enhanced CSR disclosure. The result shows that Islamic banks may have 
to increase their board size and abandon CEO duality for robust increase in CSR disclosure and 
meet stakeholders’ expectations. 




Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
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Expect Actual Beta Tolerance VIF 
Constant   0 -1.784 0.076* 0 0 
B.SIZE + + +0.176 2.049 0.042** 0.584 1.711 
B.GENDER + + +0.129 1.571 0.118 0.637 1.570 
B.COMP + - -0.032 -0.368 0.713 0.574 1.742 
B.MEET + - -0.014 -0.131 0.896 0.401 2.496 
CEO.DUAL - - -0.204 -2.021 0.045** 0.424 2.356 
B.CROSS.HOLD + - -0.010 -0.124 0.902 0.709 1.411 
SSB SIZE + + +0.172 1.364 0.174 0.272 3.681 
SSB CROSS + - -0.010 -0.103 0.918 0.439 2.279 
AC SIZE + - -0.194 -2.100 0.037** 0.507 1.972 
AC MEET + + +0.127 1.449 0.149 0.562 1.780 
INS. OWN + + +0.000 0.002 0.999 0.797 1.255 
FOR.OWN + - -0.025 -0.337 0.736 0.808 1.237 
F.SIZE + - -0.073 -0.662 0.509 0.352 2.838 
F.AGE + + +0.034 0.318 0.751 0.375 2.668 
F.LIQUID + + +0.149 1.498 0.136 0.438 2.285 
F.PROFIT + - -0.015 -0.190 0.850 0.694 1.442 
F.LEV - + +0.119 1.423 0.156 0.621 1.611 
GDP + + +0.268 2.216 0.028** 0.294 3.396 
CORRUPT - + +0.018 0.172 0.864 0.400 2.502 
Y2010   +0.277 3.144 0.002** 0.555 1.803 
Y2012   -0.113 -1.345 0.180 0.606 1.651 
Y2013   +0.126 1.427 0.155 0.550 1.820 
Y2014   +0.006 0.070 0.944 0.560 1.786 




All variables are defined as follows: B.Size (board size), B.Gender (board gender), B.Bomp (board composition), B.Meet (board meeting), 
B.Dual (board duality), B.CrossHold (board cross holding), SSB Size (Shariah supervisory board size), SSB Cross (Shariah supervisory 
board cross membership), AC Size (audit committee size), AC Meet (audit committee meeting), InsOwn (Institutional ownership), Man 
Own (Managerial ownership) F.Size (firm size), F.Age (firm age), F.Profit (return on asset), F.Lev (firm leverage), F.Liquid (return on 
equity), GDP (gross domestic product) and Corupt (level of corruption)  
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, & 1%, respectively.  
4.2.3 Empirical Analysis for Effect of CSR Disclosure on Firm Value   
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analyses of CSR disclosure consequences for Islamic 
banks in GCC countries. The results show a significant negative relationship between CSR 
disclosure and firm value proxied by MC, rather than MTBV and TQ, at 10% significant level, 
therefor H7 is not supported. This finding is consistent with prior research, such as Hassan et al. 
(2009), Elliott et al. (2014), who show that CSR disclosure is negatively associated with firm value 
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because of competitive disadvantage with rivals or making more noise to the investors. 
Nevertheless, it is contrary to Klein et al. (2005), Sheu et al. (2010), Gordon et al. (2010) and 
Anam et al. (2011) who point out that social disclosure has an impact on firm value based on 
signalling theory. As argued by Rhodes and Soobaroyen (2010) that disclosure cannot curtail 
agency problems by decreasing information asymmetry and enhance the firm value. However, it 
can be said the direction and magnitude of the relationship is associated with the type of disclosure 
(Hassan et al., 2009) and the proxy that is used for firm value (Uyar and Kiliç, 2012; Alotaibi and 
Hussainey, 2016). Thus, there is a conflicting relationship of determining the relationship between 
CSR disclosure and firm value. In addition, there is no agreement in the literature about an ideal 
measure for firm value (Mangena et al., 2012; Albassam, 2014). 
 With respect to governance variables, the results indicate that better governance leads to a 
higher firm value. Both board size and board composition have significant positive effect on firm 
value, respectively with MTBV and MC. These findings are consistent with existing literature 
(Giraldez and Hurtado, 2014; Colombo and Baglioni, 2008). Again, contrary to expectation, CEO 
duality has shown a positive significant effect on firm value as proxied by MTBV and MC. This 
finding can be explained by signaling theory, as CEO duality seems to be perceived by 
stakeholders as a signal of effective control and leadership. This finding is in line with a prior 
studies such as Peng et al. (2007) and Yang and Zhao (2014). Further, regarding control variables, 
firm profitability appear to have significant positive association with firm value proxy MTBV, 
consistent with Setia-Atmaja (2009), while GDP also reveals significant positive association with 
both MTBV and MC. On the other hand, firm size shows a negative significant relationship with 
MTBV, which is opposite to the findings of Ezat (2010) and Hassan et al. (2009). Finally, it is 
noted that Tobin’s q (TQ) as a proxy in measuring firm value does not demonstrate any significant 
relationship with any variables. Dybvig and Warachka (2015) argue that Tobin’s Q does not 
measure firm performance, rather firm value with respect to efficiency measure and cost discipline. 
Table 5: Regression Results for the Effects of CSR Disclosure on Firm Value 
Variables Exp. 
Sign 
MTBV MC Tobin-Q 
Coef. t Sig. Coef. t Sig. Coef. t Sig. 
Constant  0 -1.482 0.140 0 -5.248 0.000*** 0 1.783 0.076* 
CSRD + 0.036 0.461 0.645 -0.096 -1.705 0.090* 0.052 0.643 0.521 
B.SIZE + 0.192 2.619 0.010** -0.026 -0.496 0.621 0.038 0.501 0.617 
B.COMP + 0.006 0.077 0.938 0.088 1.712 0.089* -0.020 -0.274 0.785 
CEO.DUAL - 0.238 3.150 0.002*** 0.143 2.651 0.009*** 0.120 1.549 0.123 
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F.SIZE + -0.192 -2.166 0.032** -0.030 -0.477 0.634 0.079 0.865 0.388 
F.PROFIT + 0.111 1.400 0.163 0.202 3.560 0.000*** 0.083 1.016 0.311 
F.LEV - 0.073 0.907 0.366 0.020 0.350 0.727 0.083 0.998 0.319 
GDP + 0.178 1.906 0.058* 0.647 9.665 0.000*** 0.034 0.352 0.725 
Y2011  -0.077 -0.841 0.401 -0.097 -1.474 0.142 0.125 1.324 0.187 
Y2012  -0.093 -0.990 0.324 -0.137 -2.052 0.042** 0.127 1.323 0.188 
Y2013  -0.028 -0.316 0.752 -0.060 -0.938 0.350 0.141 1.518 0.131 
Y2014  -0.007 -0.071 0.943 -0.079 -1.186 0.237 0.180 1.892 0.060* 
Adjusted R Square 0.072 0.524 0.014 
Std.Error 1.077 0.649 0.14696 
Sig. 0.011 0.00 0.261 
Observation 195 195 195 
All variables are defined as follows: B.Size (board size), B.Comp (board composition), B.Meet (board meeting), CEO.Dual (CEO duality), F.Size (firm size), F.Profit 
(return on asset), F.Lev (firm leverage) and GDP (gross domestic products).  
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, & 1%, respectively 
 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
The aim of this research is to examine the level of CSR disclosure, its determinants and 
consequences among the 39 sample Islamic banks in the GCC countries with a total of 195 
observations for the period 2010 to 2014. Developing a comprehensive CSR disclosure index 
based on previous literature and AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 7 guidelines, it highlights the 
extent of effectiveness of wide-ranging corporate governance variables (board, SSB, audit 
committee and ownership related) in determining CSR disclosure and its impact on firm value. 
The study finds that the level of CSR disclosure among the sample GCC Islamic banks is relatively 
low, indicating that the issuance of AAOIFI guidelines on CSR disclosure could not improve the 
CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC countries. The CSR disclosures are still 
relatively low as compared to studies conducted before the issuance of AAOIFI guidelines. Several 
studies indicate that Islamic banks are not completely fulfilling their social role in accordance with 
the prescriptions of Islam. Based on the finding, it appears that Islamic banks are mainly focused 
on economic incentives more so than religious and social norms. It is thus, suggested that Islamic 
banks should enhance their CSR disclosure practice to ensure that its operations and activities are 
in line with Islamic banking principles. Therefore, policymakers should be more aggressive in 
encouraging Islamic banks to adopt AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 7 as a benchmark for CSR 
disclosure. 
 In term of the effect of corporate governance characteristics on CSR disclosure, this study 
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reports that a larger size of board of directors do engage in greater extent of CSR disclosure 
practices and CSR activities. It also finds that CEO duality and audit committee size are inversely 
affecting CSR disclosure, which is indicative of disruption to voluntary disclosure. Other CG 
characteristics variables also have no significant relationship with the level of total CSR disclosure 
among Islamic banks. It can be argued that corporate governance mechanisms are substitutive and 
may not affect voluntary disclosures. 
 In addition, this study also analyses the impact of CSR disclosure on firm value based on 
three different proxies, namely market-to-book value (MTBV), market capitalization (MC) and 
Tobin’s Q (TQ). The finding confirms a significant negative association between CSR disclosure 
and firm value (MC). This negative link between disclosure and firm value can be explained from 
signalling theory, rather than agency theory, perspective. Extra information could have a negative 
effect on firm value in the sense that the excessive CSR information disclosed may cause extra 
noise to the investors, which affects negatively on their valuation of the firm. Further, the negative 
effect on firm value could be driven by the content of the CSR information disclosed and how 
investors perceive it. There is a possibility that CSR information itself raises concerns about firm 
performance, which leads investors to lower their valuation. While CSR information could offer 
positive news to the stakeholders, they might misinterpret the practice that competitor firms would 
benefit from this excessive information. Nevertheless, this result does not support the idea that 
Islamic banks can use corporate disclosure to differentiate themselves and enhance their 
competitive advantage through increasing firm value. Again, the results reveals that the board size, 
board composition and CEO duality have significant positive effect on firm value, suggesting 
influence of dominant personality or leadership in GCC countries. 
 This study contributes to existing CSR reporting literature as being the first to examine the 
determinants of CSR disclosure in GCC Islamic banks for the year 2010-2014 using 
comprehensive corporate governance variables. Moreover, it provides a valuable contribution to 
research as it extends the understanding of how the CSR disclosure affects the firm value of GCC 
Islamic banks. The findings of the study have important implications for investors, managers, 
regulatory bodies, policy makers and Islamic banks. In an asymmetric information environment, 
corporate governance mechanisms are not yet as effective as expected for improving CSR 
disclosure. Despite Islamic banks are expected to fulfil their inherent character as an ‘Islamic’ 
bank and distinguish them from non-Islamic banks, the financial incentive is not evident because 
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of negative performance effect of CSR disclosure.  
However, managers who engage in good practices of information disclosure recommended 
continuing doing so. For those who refrain themselves from providing information to the 
stakeholders, the results call for more CSR transparency if they want their bank being more 
valuable on the eye of their stakeholders. Since there are many annual reports and websites of GCC 
Islamic banks having no disclosure of CSR information, the regulatory bodies and policy makers 
may identify a minimum benchmark for CSR disclosure that is published by each bank either in 
their annual reports or website. Further, regulatory bodies such as AAOIFI should be more 
proactive to guide Islamic banks toward the best practices of disclosures. They play a motivating 
role in this area of information disclosure. AAOIFI are also expected to have a strong collaboration 
with regulatory bodies in GCC countries to enhance CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks. 
Thus, the findings of this study have important message for GCC Islamic banks, who may need to 
know that more CSR disclosure might have a significant impact on their firm value. They should 
be more aware of CSR disclosure issues, rather than focusing only on profit maximising objectives.  
 There are several limitations inherent in this study. Firstly, the relatively small sample size 
of 39 GCC Islamic banks (from 2010-2014) may limit the application of the findings to other IFIs 
such as Takaful and the Islamic Unit Trust Company. This is a common limitation of labour-
intensive type of studies using manual content analysis and manual data collection from annual 
reports. Further study may be conducted using a large sample of data over a longer time. Through 
exploring CSR disclosure using a time series data, future research can contribute more clear 
information regarding to CSR disclosure trends and practice among GCC Islamic banks. Secondly, 
this study only focuses on some governance variables (board-related, SSB-related variables, audit 
committee variables and ownership variables), therefore future study can add more governance 
variables which may provide better result. Thirdly, the study is also limited to discuss the AAOIFI 
Governance Standards No. 7, 2010 compliance among GCC Islamic banks. Further study may be 
conducted in measuring the level of compliance with other AAOIFI governance standards or 
national standards. Finally, other studies could explore other measures of firm value such as scale 
efficiency measures or examine the non-economic consequences of CSR disclosure and firm value, 
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Appendix 1: Summary of CSR disclosure dimensions 
Main Dimensions Sub-Dimensions Source 
 
 
Social responsibility within 
organizations 
1. Employee welfare (M) AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 2009; 
Taha, 2010 
2. Policy for social development 
and environment-based 
investment quotas. (V) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Aribi, 2009; 
Aribi & Gao, 2012 
3. Earning and expenditure 
prohibited by Shariah (M) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Maali et al., 




Social responsibility in its 
relationship with customers and 
clients 
4. Par excellence customer 
services (V) 
 
AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 2009; 
Taha, 2010 
5. Policy for dealing with 
clients (M) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Belal et al., 
2014 
6. Qard-Hassan (benevolent 
loan) (V) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 2009; 
Taha, 2010; Haniffa, 1999 
 
 
Social Responsibility in 
screening its investments 
7. Micro and small business and 
social savings, investments and 
development. (V) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Maali et al., 
2006; Taha, 2010 
8.Policy for screening clients 
(M) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Maali et al., 




Social responsibility in its 
relationship with greater society 
 
9. Zakat (M) 
 
AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 2009; 
Taha, 2010; Haniffa, 1999 
10.Charitable activities (V) AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 




AAOIFI, 2010; Aribi, 2009; 
Aribi & Gao, 2012 










 Appendix 2: Summary of variables definitions 
Variable Definition Measurement Source 
CSRD  Quantity of CSRD score by 
sample banks 
The percentage of CSR 
information disclosure by 
Islamic banks 
Annual Report 
MTBV Market-to-book value ratio The natural logarithm of 
market value of equity to 
book value of equity ratio. 
 
Data Stream 
MC  Firm value based on market 
capitalization 
By multiplying a company's 
shares outstanding by the 




TQ Tobin’s Q The natural logarithm of: 
(total assets + market value 
of equity - total common 
equity/ total assets   
Data Stream 
 
B. SIZE Board size The total number of directors 
on board 
Annual Report 
B. GENDER Gender of BOD A dummy variable equals 1 
if the all boards member of 
the firm is male and 0 
otherwise. 
Annual Report 
B. COMP Board composition 
- ratio of exec and non-exec 
in the board 
The board composition is 
calculated as the number of 
non-executive directors 
divided by board size 
Annual Report 
B. MEET Board meetings The total number of board 
meetings during the year 
Annual Report 
CEO. DUAL Role of CEO duality A dummy variable equals 1 
if the chairman is the same 
person as the CEO of the 
firm,0 otherwise 
Annual Report 
B. CROSS Cross Holding Directorship A dummy variable equals 1 
if the Director (regardless of 




sits on more than one board, 
0 otherwise. 
SSB SIZE Shariah Supervisory Board 
size 
The total number of Shariah 
supervisory board committee 
Annual Report 
SSB CROSS Shariah supervisory board 
cross membership 
A dummy variable equals 1 
if the SSB member sits more 
than one board and, 0 
otherwise. 
Annual Report 
AC SIZE Audit committee size The total number of audit 
committee members. 
Annual Report 
AC MEET Audit committee meeting The total number of AC 
meetings during the year 
Annual Report 
INS OWN4 Institutional ownership The aggregate percentage of 
shares that are held by 
institutional shareholders.  
Annual Report 
/DataStream/ 
FOR OWN Foreign Ownership The aggregate percentage of 




F. SIZE Firm size The natural logarithm of 
firms’ total assets. 
 Data stream  
F. AGE Firm age The age of the firm Data stream 
F. PROFIT Profitability The profitability measured 
by return on equity  
Data stream 





F. LIQUID Liquidity Current assets/Current 
liabilities  
Data stream 
GDP Growth domestic products GDP of the sample countries World Bank 





                                                          
4 In collecting the data for INS OWN and FOR OWN, a few source of information is analysed in measuring 
the aggregate percentage of shares hold by institutional/foreign shareholders in companies annual reports 
and data stream. 
